Religion

A frequently presented argument against veganism is: My religion or my God permits me to eat (certain kinds of) meat.

This argument differs from the creation argument, according to which animals were created for humans or their use is part of a divine order. While the creation argument primarily concerns the status of animals, the religion argument mainly concerns the relationship between God and humans.

The structure is not: Animals are here for us. Rather: God has permitted humans to eat meat. Therefore, it is morally legitimate to eat meat.

The decisive assumption is that divine permission constitutes moral justification. Moral legitimacy is not derived from sentience, justice, or necessity, but from divine authority. The underlying principle is: Whatever God permits is morally justified.

In this way, the ethical discussion shifts from generally accessible moral arguments to a theological justification.

Several objections can be raised against this argument, addressing different levels: intra-religious, normative, hermeneutical, epistemic, and philosophy-of-religion considerations.

1. The Bible begins and ends vegan.

In Genesis 1:29–30, God gives humans every plant for food. The animals are likewise given exclusively plant-based nourishment. Meat is not presented as the original diet.

Only after the Flood is meat consumption permitted (Genesis 9:3). This permission appears not as an ideal state, but as a later extension.

At the end of the biblical narrative, visions of non-violent coexistence appear: Isaiah 11:6–9 describes the wolf dwelling with the lamb and the lion eating straw like the ox. Isaiah 65:25 emphasizes that neither harm nor destruction shall occur. Revelation 21:4 speaks of a world without suffering and death. Symbolically, the biblical story begins and ends with a non-violent order.

2. Everything is permitted, but not everything is beneficial.

In 1 Corinthians 10:23 it says: “Everything is permissible — but not everything is beneficial. Everything is permissible — but not everything builds up.” A clear distinction is made here between permission and moral optimality. Divine permission is not a divine command. That something is allowed does not mean it is morally preferable.

3. Concession because of hardened hearts.

In Matthew 19:8, Jesus says: “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. But it was not this way from the beginning.” Here Jesus explicitly distinguishes between an original ideal and a later concession. Not every biblical permission reflects God’s original will. Although the passage specifically concerns divorce, it formulates a general principle: Some regulations are concessions to human conditions. Therefore, permission does not automatically equal moral justification.

4. The possibility of a moral test.

Religious traditions often emphasize that God grants humans freedom. This freedom implies responsibility. If something is permitted, the test may lie precisely in whether one chooses merely what is allowed or what is morally best. The decisive question is therefore not only whether we may do something, but whether we should do it under present conditions.

5. The Euthyphro dilemma.

The core philosophical question is: Is something good because God declares it good, or does God declare it good because it is good?

If God declares things good because they are good, then a standard of goodness exists independently of God. God’s approval would then not be the ultimate justification.

If, however, something is good because God declares it so, then morality depends entirely on God’s will. This leads to a problem of arbitrariness: Theoretically, anything could be good if God so willed it. Additionally, there is an epistemic problem: How can we be certain what God truly wills? One could even imagine a deity whose intentions surpass human understanding and who manipulates moral intuitions. Without an independent standard, moral orientation becomes unstable.

6. The burden of proof.

Before invoking God as moral justification, one would need to plausibly demonstrate that this God exists, that the revelation is authentic, and that the commandments are correctly interpreted. Otherwise, anyone could claim that their God permits or demands certain actions. Without a verifiable foundation, morality would become arbitrary.

The central question therefore remains: Is the treatment of animals morally justified under present conditions — independently of whether it is religiously permitted?