Tradition

Full explanation

A frequently presented argument against veganism is that the consumption of animal products is deeply rooted in human tradition. Humans have hunted, domesticated, and used animals for thousands of years. Our ancestors ate meat, practiced animal husbandry, and processed animal products in nearly all cultures. It is sometimes added that animal-based foods were evolutionarily significant and contributed to the development of the human brain. Without meat, the implicit assumption goes, we might not be where we are today.

From this historical continuity, it is concluded that the use of animals is morally legitimate. Tradition here functions not merely as a description of what humans have long done, but as a justification for what may continue to be done. The underlying structure of the argument can be expressed as follows:

A ⇒ B

A: A practice is traditional.
B: This practice is morally justified.

In other words: Everything that is traditional is justified solely because it is traditional. The fact that a practice is traditional implies that it is justified.

Full reply

The central question is whether tradition truly constitutes a sufficient moral criterion. The argument from tradition implicitly claims that from the fact that something has been practiced for a long time, it follows that it is morally right. Formally stated:

A ⇒ B

A: A practice is traditional.
B: This practice is morally justified.

The contrapositive of this statement is:

¬B ⇒ ¬A

If a practice is not justified, then it cannot be traditional.

This is precisely where the problem becomes apparent. There are numerous historical and cultural practices that were traditional for long periods of time but are now considered morally problematic or clearly unjustified: the traditional restriction of women’s rights, slavery, public executions, corporal punishment of children, colonial exploitation, or certain forms of animal entertainment such as bullfighting. These examples demonstrate that tradition and moral justification do not automatically coincide.

A single counterexample is sufficient to refute the general claim that tradition necessarily confers moral legitimacy. If there exists even one traditional practice that is not justified, then the implication A ⇒ B is false.

Tradition initially describes only what people have long done. It is a descriptive category. Moral justification, by contrast, is a normative evaluation. From an “it has been so” one cannot automatically derive an “it ought to remain so.” This transition from being to ought is not philosophically self-evident.

The evolutionary argument does not change this conclusion. The fact that animal-based food may have been relevant for survival under certain historical conditions does not mean that its use remains morally necessary under today’s technological and societal conditions. Our ancestors also lived without democratic rights, without modern medicine, and without gender equality — yet we do not derive from this any obligation to preserve those conditions.

Traditions can provide stability and cultural identity. However, moral progress historically often consists precisely in critically examining traditions and, where appropriate, overcoming them. The relevant question is therefore not whether a practice is traditional, but whether it can be morally justified under present conditions.